See here.
Saturday, August 11, 2012
Attention Gnus (you too Loftus): The appeal to ridicule is a fallacy
Posted on 1:08 PM by Unknown
Hambourger's design argument
Posted on 12:49 PM by Unknown
Hambourger argues that even if there is no evidence of interference by a designer in the course of evolution, we have to consider the fact that living creatures are made up of genetic material that reproduces after its kind, but not exactly. We could have reproduction that only produces exact duplicates, in which case evolution would be impossible, since there would be no variation. We could also have genetic material that changes very rapidly, in which case speciation would be chaotic, and evolution would also be impossible. That fact that genetic material changes gradually is the only scenario that makes evolution possible. But why did we happen to have genetic material that mutates at just the right pace? Doesn't that imply a background designer?
For some critical comment, see here.
For some critical comment, see here.
C. S. Lewis was never a real atheist
Posted on 11:59 AM by Unknown
A redated post.
According to this essay from an online secular humanist site, which indulges extensively in the "horse laugh" fallacy.
This reminds me of something. Oh I know. Those Christians who say that if you deconvert, you never were a Christian to begin with.
According to this essay from an online secular humanist site, which indulges extensively in the "horse laugh" fallacy.
This reminds me of something. Oh I know. Those Christians who say that if you deconvert, you never were a Christian to begin with.
Monday, August 6, 2012
An old AFR interview
Posted on 10:39 AM by Unknown
Here's an interview I did on the AFR way back in 2006. My segment starts aroung minute 48.
Sunday, August 5, 2012
A sound argument for the unmoved mover?
Posted on 2:38 PM by Unknown
Here. Someone was asking if the First Way was still alive. But no one paid attention to this post I did a few weeks back.
Friday, August 3, 2012
More on reductios and the AFe
Posted on 9:26 PM by Unknown
I'm Skeptical wrote:
If I understand Victor's position, a skeptic can't defend the argument from evil unless he concedes that there are objective moral values. This is a parlor trick. It's equivalent to saying that if I want to make the statement "If A then B" I must first concede that A is true.
If you accept Victor's position, why not take the same logic one step further and demand that the skeptic concede that God exists before he can defend AE?
VR: No, you don't understand my position. I admitted that reductio versions of the argument from evil are possible, even for those who don't believe in moral objectivity. The problem is going to arise when the atheist/subjectivist tries to defend the moral premise of the argument. The subjectivist can't appeal to his own value theory to argue about what it is for God to be good.
Let's take this statement from Rowe:
An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
Now, does theist necessarily have to believe this? And if they do believe it, do they have to agree with the atheist about what would be a greater good or the prevention of some evil equally bad or worse? If there are any value-theoretic conflicts, someone committed to objective moral values can argue that the theist's value system is faulty. They can argue that the theist has some misplaced values, and in particular, perhaps, undervalues the prevention of intense suffering and makes inflates the legitimacy of other values which, he argues, are not sufficient justifiers for intense suffering. A subjectivist can't do that. The logic of his argument forces him to concede the value-theoretic position of his theist opponent at every turn, since he cannot
The most serious objection to this line of argument comes in the Mark Nelson post, from Thrasymachus. I will need a separate post to respond to that.
If I understand Victor's position, a skeptic can't defend the argument from evil unless he concedes that there are objective moral values. This is a parlor trick. It's equivalent to saying that if I want to make the statement "If A then B" I must first concede that A is true.
If you accept Victor's position, why not take the same logic one step further and demand that the skeptic concede that God exists before he can defend AE?
VR: No, you don't understand my position. I admitted that reductio versions of the argument from evil are possible, even for those who don't believe in moral objectivity. The problem is going to arise when the atheist/subjectivist tries to defend the moral premise of the argument. The subjectivist can't appeal to his own value theory to argue about what it is for God to be good.
Let's take this statement from Rowe:
An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
Now, does theist necessarily have to believe this? And if they do believe it, do they have to agree with the atheist about what would be a greater good or the prevention of some evil equally bad or worse? If there are any value-theoretic conflicts, someone committed to objective moral values can argue that the theist's value system is faulty. They can argue that the theist has some misplaced values, and in particular, perhaps, undervalues the prevention of intense suffering and makes inflates the legitimacy of other values which, he argues, are not sufficient justifiers for intense suffering. A subjectivist can't do that. The logic of his argument forces him to concede the value-theoretic position of his theist opponent at every turn, since he cannot
The most serious objection to this line of argument comes in the Mark Nelson post, from Thrasymachus. I will need a separate post to respond to that.
Wednesday, August 1, 2012
Reductios and the argument from evil
Posted on 6:59 PM by Unknown
This links to a bunch of posts I did on the topic of the argument from evil as a reductio. What happens when someone who doesn't believe in moral objectivity defends the argument from evil?
The problem arises when the argument requires are fairly finely tuned moral claim. Someone might say "If God is good, then he can't allow gratuitous suffering. The theist answers "Why? What's wrong with permitting gratuitous suffering?" The atheist can't say that it's objectively wrong for God to do that, so he has to argue that the theist believes that it is wrong for God to do that? The atheist then has to work from inside the moral belief system of the person with whom he is arguing. But moral belief-systems amongst theists, and even Christians differ from one another.
Calvinists think that God is justified in creating people for the sake of reprobating them in hell forever, for the sake of God's own glory. I happen to disagree with them, but I believe in objective moral values. How can a subjectivist argue with them?
The problem arises when the argument requires are fairly finely tuned moral claim. Someone might say "If God is good, then he can't allow gratuitous suffering. The theist answers "Why? What's wrong with permitting gratuitous suffering?" The atheist can't say that it's objectively wrong for God to do that, so he has to argue that the theist believes that it is wrong for God to do that? The atheist then has to work from inside the moral belief system of the person with whom he is arguing. But moral belief-systems amongst theists, and even Christians differ from one another.
Calvinists think that God is justified in creating people for the sake of reprobating them in hell forever, for the sake of God's own glory. I happen to disagree with them, but I believe in objective moral values. How can a subjectivist argue with them?
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